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THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
Valerie M. Fogleman* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A) is approaching 
its twentieth anniversary. NEP A case law evolved slowly during the 
1980's as the Act lost much of the notoriety gained during the 1970's 
when courts ordered unwilling agencies to incorporate NEP A pro-
cedures into their decisionmaking processes. 1 Judicial interpretations 
are occasionally controversiaF but, in general, NEP A case law is 
slowly refining broad concepts laid down in early NEP A opinions. 3 
One area of NEP A case law that has evolved slowly but steadily 
involves threshold determinations. The level set for threshold de-
terminations by federal courts and agencies is critical to NEPA's 
* Visiting Instructor, University of Illinois College of Law. J.D. 1986, B.L.A. 1983 at Texas 
Tech University. This Article was written while the author was Natural Resources Law 
Fellow, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. Funding for the Article was 
provided by the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development with funds 
obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, appropriated under the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 
The author would like to thank Professors Michael C. Blumm and James L. Huffman of 
Northwestern School of Law for their aid in writing this Article, and Lenair Mulford for her 
secretarial and editorial skills. 
1 See, e.g., Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 
1090 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (fast breeder reactor program could not proceed to technology devel-
opment stage until AEC complied with NEPA); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n, Inc. v. 
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court criticized AEC for its 
"crabbed interpretation of NEPA"). 
2 See Brock, Abolishing the Worst Case Analysis, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 22, 64-66 
(Spring 1986) (criticizing Southern Ore. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984)). 
3 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (requiring agency compliance with NEPA to the fullest extent 
possible); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971) ("[a]t the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law"), vacated, 342 
F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), a/I'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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implementation because the Act does not apply to federal actions 
unless they "significantly [affect] the quality of the human environ-
ment .... "4 If a determination is made that an action does not have 
significant environmental effects, compliance with NEP A is not re-
quired. 
This Article reviews the current state of the law regarding NEP A 
threshold determinations. Section II discusses the methodology used 
by agencies to make threshold determinations. Section III examines 
the types of federal actions requiring threshold determinations. Sec-
tion IV discusses the nature of the effects to be considered in thresh-
old determinations. The final Section examines the criteria used by 
federal agencies to make threshold determinations. The Article con-
cludes that the refinement of case law on threshold determinations 
has expanded the range of actions to be considered by federal agen-
cies involved in those determinations. No general threshold level 
has been defined beyond which it may be concluded that actions 
significantly affect the environment. Consideration of the criteria 
developed by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the 
courts, however, ensures that most, if not all, areas of environmental 
concern are addressed in threshold determinations. 
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS 
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement 
for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment . . . ."5 Before proceeding with a proposed ac-
tion, therefore, a federal agency must make a threshold determina-
tion whether the action has a potentially significant effect on the 
environment. If such an effect is indicated; the agency must prepare 
a detailed statement, known as an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS).6Ifthe agency determines that the effect will be insignificant, 
442 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations 
advocate a one-part test for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment": if a federal action significantly affects the quality of the human environ-
ment, it is a major federal action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1986). Most courts apply this test. See 
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1430-32 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
Even when courts apply a two-pronged test, a decision usually turns on whether an action 
"significantly affects" the environment. See City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 
756 F.2d 1014, 1020 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Note, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage 
in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. ENvT'L L. REV. 347, 359 (1979). 
542 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
6Id. The EIS analyzes (1) the action's significant environmental impacts including any 
unavoidable adverse effects; (2) alternative actions; (3) the relationship between local short-
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it may proceed with its action, usually after explaining and justifying 
why it has concluded no significant environmental effects exist. 
Federal agencies are aided in making threshold determinations by 
the CEQ, a small agency in the Executive Office of the President. 
Under authority derived from NEPA and an Executive Order,7 the 
CEQ issues regulations to aid federal agencies in implementing 
NEP A.8 The regulations, which bind federal agencies and which are 
accorded substantial deference by the courts,9 establish procedures 
for the entire NEPA process. Because the CEQ regulations are less 
detailed for procedures involving threshold determinations than for 
procedures involving the preparation of EISs, agencies have more 
discretion in structuring methodology for threshold determinations. 
Thus, federal agency regulations implementing NEP A generally sup-
plement the CEQ procedures for making threshold determinations. 10 
Federal actions can be roughly divided into three groups for 
NEP A purposes. At one extreme are actions that normally have a 
significant effect on the environment. If an agency determines that 
a proposal for action falls into this category, the agency proceeds 
directly to the EIS process detailed in the CEQ regulations. ll Agen-
cies typically include lists of such actions in their guidelines or reg-
ulations implementing NEP A. 12 
At the other extreme are actions that normally do not have a 
significant effect on the environment, either individually or cumu-
term uses of natural resources and the maintenance and enhancement of the resource's long-
term productivity; and (4) any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources involved 
in the action's implementation. 
742 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982); Exec. Order 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970), as amended by Exec. 
Order 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. at 508-10 (1982). 
840 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1986). 
9 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 357 (1979). The courts do not necessarily adhere 
rigidly to the regulations, and often use the regulations in conjunction with judicial precedent. 
See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 752 F.2d 754,758-60 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying CEQ regulations 
and Ninth Circuit precedents). 
10 See, e.g., Federal Highway Administration, Environmental Impact and Related Proce-
dures, 23 C.F.R. § 771. 119(b) (1987) (suggesting use ofscoping in Environmental Assessment 
process); Department of the Interior, National Environmental Policy Act; Revising Imple-
menting Procedures, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,437, 21,439 (1984) (same) [hereinafter Revised Proce-
dures]; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, revised NOAA Directive Imple-
menting the National Environmental Policy Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,644, 29,649 (1984) 
[hereinafter Revised NOAA Directive] (same). 
11 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1986). 
12 See, e.g., Corps of Engineers, Policy and Procedures for Implementing NEPA, 33 C.F.R. 
§ 230 (1987); Department of the Interior, Notice of Instructions for the Minerals Management 
Service, 51 Fed. Reg. 1855, 1856 (1986); Revised NOAA Directive, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,644, 
29,651 (1984). 
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latively. The CEQ regulations permit agencies to designate such 
actions as categorical exclusions. 13 Agencies must publish their lists 
of categorical exclusions (usually in the Code of Federal Regulations 
or the Federal Register), making the actions exempt from the NEPA 
process. 14 Agency procedures, however, must provide for the occur-
rence of extraordinary circumstances in which a categorical exclusion 
may have a potentially significant environmental effect and, there-
fore, would not be exempt. 15 The CEQ recommends that agencies 
submit draft lists of categorical exclusions to the CEQ for review in 
order that the lists may be reviewed for compliance with the CEQ 
regulations. 16 
In 1983, the CEQ criticized the agencies' widespread use of lists 
of categorical exclusions as potentially inflexible. In lieu of lists, the 
CEQ recommended the use of broadly defined criteria to characterize 
the types of actions which normally do not cause environmental 
effects. The CEQ suggested that agencies supplement the criteria 
with examples of frequently conducted activities that normally fall 
under the specified criteria. 17 
One agency that has developed criteria is the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA). The FHWA defines categorical exclusions 
as categories of actions not involving "significant environmental im-
pacts or substantial planning, time or resources."18 Such actions "will 
not induce significant foreseeable alterations in land use, planned 
growth, development patterns, or natural or cultural resources."19 
13 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1986). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines 
categorical exclusions as: "actions which do not individually, cumulatively over time, or in 
conjunction with other Federal, State, local, or private actions have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment and which have been identified as having no such effect 
[according to agency procedures]." [d. § 6.107(a). This definition does not bind other agencies, 
however. 
14 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986). See, e.g., Corps of Engineers, Policy and Procedures for 
Implementing NEPA, 33 C.F.R. pt. 230, app. D (1987); Federal Highway Administration, 
Environmental Impact and Related Procedures, 23 C.F.R. § 771.115 (1987); Revised NOAA 
Directive, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,644, 29,652 (1984). 
15 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986). 
16 Council on Environmental Quality, Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 
34,263, 34,265 (1983) [hereinafter NEPA Regulations]. 
17 [d. at 34,264-65. See also Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum for Agency 
and General Counsel Liaison on National Environmental Policy Act Matters, Recommenda-
tions for Improving Agency NEPA Procedures, reprinted in 3 Env't Rep. (BNA) 82,83 (May 
19, 1972) (recommending that agencies list full range of potential impacts for typical agency 
actions). 
18 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(a) (1987). 
19 [d. 
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The regulations' criteria for extraordinary circumstances in which a 
categorical exclusion would not be exempt includes "substantial con-
troversy on environmental grounds,"20 and inconsistencies with fed-
eral, state, or local laws or administrative determinations relating 
to the environment. 21 In a challenge to the FHWA's categorical 
exclusion regulation, a court determined that the accompanying list 
of categorical exclusions in the regulations gave adequate meaning 
to the agency's general definition of substantiality. The court de-
ferred to the agency's definition of substantiality rather than adopt-
ing its own definition or that of the challenger to the agency's ac-
tion.22 
Another agency, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), has 
a more detailed definition of "substantial controversy on environ-
mental grounds. "23 An action is exempt from the FAA's categorical 
exclusions when it is "highly controversial on environmental 
grounds." Highly controversial is defined as opposition to an action 
by a federal, state or local agency, or "a substantial number of the 
persons affected by such action .... "24 In other words, opposition 
must be of an "extraordinary" nature. 25 In construing the FAA's 
regulation, a court determined that opposition was not extraordinary 
when no governmental agencies objected, and when the number of 
people objecting was small compared to the area affected by the 
action. 26 
If conditions exist that may exempt a proposed action from being 
a categorical exclusion, then an agency must address those condi-
tions. For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a 
permit to Sea World for scientific research on killer whales. 27 The 
permit would also allow public display of some of the whales.28 Per-
mits for scientific research and public display are one of the agency's 
categorical exclusions. 29 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's denial of the permit until the agency addressed public con-
20 [d. § 771.117(c)(2). 
21 [d. § 771.117(c)(4). 
22 City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (4th Cir. 1985). 
23 West Houston Air Comm'n v. FAA, 784 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing FAA Order 




27 Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827-29 (9th Cir. 1986). 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
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troversy concerning the environmental consequences of the agency's 
action. 30 
Between the two extremes of significance and nonsignificance lies 
a large gray area in which threshold determinations are made on a 
case-by-case basis. The CEQ regulations require agencies to prepare 
Environmental Assessments (EAs) to aid decisionmakers in deter-
mining whether the threshold of significance has been passed by a 
proposed action. 31 As with actions requiring EISs and categorical 
exclusions, agencies frequently list actions requiring preparation of 
an EA.32 
An EA is "a concise public document" briefly providing the evi-
dence and analysis necessary to make a threshold determination. 33 
'Phe document must include brief discussions of the proposal's ne-
cessity, alternative proposals, environmental impacts of the pro-
posed and alternative actions, and a list of agencies and private 
parties consulted. 34 Environmental agencies and the public must be 
involved in the preparation of an EA "to the extent practicable 
•••• ":'15 The CEQ recommends the use of scoping-a pluralistic de-
cisionmaking process used to identify the range of actions, alterna-
tives, and impacts covered in an EIB-to identify alternatives or 
potentially significant environmental impacts that may have been 
overlooked by the agency in preparing an EA.36 
Although the CEQ regulations do not specify the appropriate 
length for an EA, the CEQ recommends ten to fifteen pages, with 
3{J Id. 
31 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1986). If another agency has already prepared an EA for an action 
relating to the same project, the agency with the proposed action may adopt the other agency's 
EA instead of preparing a separate one. However, the adopting agency should independently 
evaluate the information in the EA, and assume full responsibility for the information's scope 
and content. NEP A Regulations, supra note 16, at 34,265-66. 
32 See, c.g., Corps of Engineers, Policy and Procedures for Implementing NEPA, 33 C.F.R. 
§ 230.7 (1986); Revised NOAA Directives, supra note 10, at 29,651. 
'<140 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (1986). 
''4 Id. § 1508.9(b). 
3f> Id. § 1501.4(b). For example, in the Ninth Circuit, certain EAs must provide for a 45-
day comment period. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1244-47 (9th Cir. 1984). 
36 Council on Environmental Quality, Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,030 (1981) [hereinafter 
NEPA Questions]. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501. 7 (1986). To facilitate public and agency involve-
mpnt in the NEPA process, appendices to the CEQ regulations list federal and federal-state 
agencies with jurisdiction over, or special expertise in, environmental issues. Council on 
Environmental Quality, Appendices to Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,750 (1984). The append-
ices also list federal and federal-state agency NEPA contacts, and federal and federal-state 
agency offices for receiving and commenting on other agencies' environmental documents. Id. 
at 49,750. 
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background data incorporated by reference. 37 If an agency deter-
mines, after it has prepared an EA, that its proposed action will not 
have a significant effect on the environment, it must prepare a 
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONS!) setting out the reasons 
for its determination. 38 If certain factors are given greater weight 
than others in making the determination, the agency must explain 
the reasons for the background decisions. 39 The EA may be attached 
to the FONSI and incorporated by reference or it may be summa-
rized in the FONS!. Other relevant environmental documents must 
be noted. 40 
The FONSI, as well as the EA, must be made available to the 
public. 41 The CEQ permits agencies to choose the best method of 
accomplishing this as long as they ensure that all interested or 
affected parties are notified. 42 The CEQ recommends mailing notices 
of the documents' availability to interested national groups as well 
as pUblication in the Federal Register and national publications for 
actions with a national scope. 43 Notice of availability of EAs and 
FONSIs for regional or site-specific proposals may be provided by 
pUblication in local newspapers.44 The system is more formal in the 
Second Circuit, where notice and comment procedures must be fol-
lowed. 45 
Under certain circumstances the CEQ recommends that FONSIs 
be published thirty days before an agency's final decision not to 
prepare an EIS. The CEQ provides five examples: borderline cases 
where a reasonable argument exists for preparation of an EIS; un-
usual cases (for example, new types of actions or precedent-setting 
cases such as minor development in a pristine area); cases involving 
public or scientific controversy; cases similar to those that normally 
require preparation of an EIS;46 and cases in which an agency has 
adopted another agency's EA.47 
37 NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,037. 
38 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(I) (1986). 
39 NEPA Questions, supra note 33, at 18,037. 
40 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1986). 
41Id. § 1501.4(e)(1). 
42 NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,037. 
43Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(1973). See generally City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 648 n.15 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(commenting on Second Circuit's procedures for publishing FONSls). 
46 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2) (1986); NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,037. 
47 NEPA Regulations, supra note 16, at 34,266. 
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If an agency determines on the basis of an EA that its proposed 
action may significantly affect the environment, the agency must 
prepare an EIS.48 The EIS must address all potentially significant 
environmental effects, including short-term and long-term impacts. 49 
If adverse effects, alternatives, and public comments regarding 
those effects and alternatives are adequately considered, however, 
the agency has complied with NEPA and may proceed with its 
action. 50 
EAs and FONSIs are, of course, subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Courts review EAs and FONSIs to ensure that adequate consider-
ation has been given to all potential environmental effects of a pro-
posed action. 51 If a substantial environmental concern is raised, the 
agency must address it in the EA and show why it will not be 
significant. 52 Likewise, all potential environment effects must be 
addressed in FONSIs.53 
Consideration of environmental factors must be documented in the 
administrative record in existence at the time the determination of 
no significant impact is made. The detailed analysis necessary in an 
EIS is not required in an EA, but the EA must not be conclusory 
or perfunctory. 54 Rather, the agency must show that sufficient infor-
mation has been generated by its investigation and data gathering 
processes on which to base a determination that its action will not 
have a significant environmental effect. 55 A court may go outside an 
agency's record to see if the research or analysis adequately supports 
the agency's conclusions. 56 If convincing documentation supports a 
reasoned elaboration of why an action will not have significant ef-
fects, then it will be upheld. 57 In other words, the agency must show 
48 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(I) (1986). 
49 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1975). 
50 See, e.g., California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584,609 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Department of Interior 
adequately addressed Oregon's and Washington's concerns on environmental effects of five-
year offshore oil and gas leasing program in a supplemental EIS); Pack v. Corps of Eng'rs, 
428 F. Supp. 460, 466 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (Corps adequately considered fisherman's loss of 
shrimp caused by dredge and fill activities). 
51 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
52Id. 
53 Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 435 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
54 Id. at 434; Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419, 426 (D. Conn. 1972). 
55 American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 835 (D. D.C. 1980); Get 
Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 468 F. Supp. 82, 86 (C.D. Cal. 1979); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 
F. Supp. 221, 250 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 
56 See Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 665 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. Or. 1987). 
57 Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1099 (1984). 
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that it has taken a "hard look" at environmental concerns raised by 
its proposed action,58 identified relevant environmental concerns, and 
made a convincing argument that the impact of each concern will be 
insignificant. 59 
If an agency's threshold determination is challenged, a critical 
factor in judicial review is the degree to which other agencies and 
the public participated in the determination. For example, courts 
accord greater weight to an agency's determination of nonsignific-
ance if the agency held public hearings,60 or if environmental agencies 
did not consider the action's effects to be potentially significant.61 
Lack of public comments on a proposal, however, does not demon-
strate that a proposed action is unlikely to have significant environ-
mental effects.62 If an agency ignores negative comments made by 
the public and other agencies, especially agencies with environmen-
tal expertise, the agency's determination is unlikely to survive ju-
dicial review. 63 Although the comments are not determinative ,64 
agencies must show that they were considered. If the comments are 
adequately considered, the agency does not violate NEP A by re-
jecting them. 65 
Courts generally uphold EAs and FONSIs unless a challenger can 
show one of the following: (1) the proposed action may have a sig-
nificant environmental effect;66 (2) an environmental factor may be 
significantly degraded;67 or (3) an environmental concern has been 
raised but not adequately addressed. 68 Inadequate consideration of 
58 Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 
404 F. Supp. 221, 250 (W.D. Mo. 1975). 
59 Maryland-Nat'! Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 
1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
60 See River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986). 
61 See Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973); Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon 
Dev. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.P.R. 1983). 
62 See Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (D. Haw. 1976). 
63 See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Corps of Eng'rs, 
701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983). 
64 See Save the Bay, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
65 See Hart & Miller Islands Area Envt'l Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 505 F. Supp. 732, 
758 (D. Md. 1980). 
66 Kentucky ex rel. Beshear v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 1981); City of Davis 
v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,673 (9th Cir. 1975); Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 639 F. Supp. 
1525, 1530 (E.D. La. 1986). 
67 See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973). 
68 See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); Foundation on Economic 
Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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environmental effects may be shown by proving that the agency 
relied on materially false or inaccurate information, that its conclu-
sions ignored the differing views of other expert agencies,69 or that 
it merely concluded that an environmental effect was insignificant 
without assessing the effect. 70 
If an agency's scope of inquiry into the potential environmental 
effects of a proposed action is adequate, courts examine the agency's 
determination of nonsignificance71 according to fairly deferential 
standards of review. The standard varies between the different cir-
cuits. Some circuits apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, 72 
while others apply the more searching reasonableness standard. 73 
Even within a circuit, the application of a test can result in incon-
sistencies. 74 The result is a state of general confusion that three 
justices of the Supreme Court have indicated they would like to 
address. 75 
III. TYPES OF ACTIONS REQUIRING THRESHOLD 
DETERMINATIONS 
A determination of whether a proposed action and its environ-
mental effects are to be considered alone or in conjunction with other 
actions and effects is critical to a threshold determination of whether 
an EIS must be written. An unconnected action may impact tem-
porarily only on a small section of an identified natural resource. If 
the action is one of many agency actions in the same area, however, 
the environmental effects may be synergistic. 
69 See Sierra Club v. Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983) (adequacy of EIS). 
70 See Foundation on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 153; Southern Ore. Citizens Against 
Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 
(1984); see also Get Oil Out, Inc. v. Andrus, 468 F. Supp. 82, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (Geological 
Survey's conclusions that environmental effects of constructing offshore oil platforms were 
insignificant were inadequate without basis for conclusions). 
71 An agency's determination of whether an action may have significant environmental 
effects is a factual issue. See Fritiofson, 772 F.2d at 1248. 
72 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(l973); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1973); 
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1035 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
73 See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1973); Minnesota Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor 
Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
74 See Comment, Shall We Be Arbitrary or Reasonable: Standards of Review for Agency 
Threshold Determinations Under NEPA, 19 AKRON L. REV. 685, 691-92 (1986). 
75 Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1060 (1985) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 
106 S. Ct. 1283, 1284 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (reiterating desire 
to resolve scope of inquiry issue). 
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Neither NEPA nor its legislative history defines in detail which 
types of federal actions require EISs. The Act merely requires· 
detailed statements for "proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions .... "76 Many tests have been devised for deciding 
when an action should be considered separately or together with 
other actions for purposes of NEP A. Creation of the tests began in 
the courts and continued with the CEQ regulations. As a result, 
courts tend to apply their precedent together with the CEQ regu-
lations when deciding particular fact situations. 77 
A. Judicial Tests for Joint Actions 
One of the earliest tests for considering the environmental effects 
of joint actions was introduced in Scientists' Institute for Public 
Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission. 78 The "irretriev-
able commitment" test is derived from NEPA's language requiring 
EISs to include discussion of "any irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action should it be implemented."79 In Scientists' Institute, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit ordered the Atomic Energy Commission to 
prepare an EIS for its liquid metal fast breeder reactor research 
and development program. 80 The court reasoned that the long-term 
commitment of resources to the program had the effect of foreclosing 
later alternative energy options. 81 
The "irretrievable commitment" test has been widely used in high-
way segmentation cases. For example, the Second Circuit upheld a 
district court's determination that potential alternatives to highway 
development could be foreclosed by federal funding of local highway 
projects. 82 The court viewed the funding as an irretrievable commit-
ment of resources for which a comprehensive EIS might never be 
prepared. 83 The court, accordingly, required the agency to consider 
the potential broad environmental effects of the projects. 84 
Another test, the "irrational or unwise" test, is similar to the 
"irretrievable commitment" test. The purpose of the "irrational and 
76 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). 
77 See infra text accompanying notes 107-150 (discussing CEQ regulations for types of 
actions to be considered under NEPA). 
78 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1982). 
80 481 F.2d at 1090. 
81 [d. 
B2 Conservation Soc'y of Southern Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 
1974), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975). 
83 [d. at 935. 
84 [d. 
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unwise" test is to determine if a proposed action is so dependent on 
subsequent phases "that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, 
to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also 
undertaken."85 If the response is positive, the environmental effects 
of the dependent phases must be considered together in one EIS.86 
In addition, actions that could be considered largely independent 
must be considered together if they are part of a larger scheme 
requiring the long-term commitment of similar resources in the 
area. 87 
The Ninth Circuit has used the "irrational or unwise" test to find 
that it was not irrational for an agency to consider the first phase of 
a dam and reservoir project separately from the second phase. 88 The 
court determined that the first phase, consisting of constructing the 
dam and reservoir and filling it to a capacity of 100,000 acre feet, 
did not depend on the second phase in which an additional 100,000 
acre feet of water was to be added. 89 In a subsequent case, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that it would be irrational for the environmental 
effects of mining in one area to be considered separately when con-
tractual obligations also required vast areas of surrounding land to 
be mined. 90 In another case, the court required the United States 
Forest Service to consider the environmental effects of a road con-
struction project and a timber sale in one EIS.91 The court considered 
it irrational for the Forest Service to construct a road to access 
timber and then not to sell the timber accessed by the road. 92 
A third judicial test is the "independent utility" test under which 
the environmental effects of proposed actions must be considered 
together if the actions are functionally or economically related to 
other actions. 93 The test, which is widely used in connection with 
highway projects, focuses on identifying segments of projects-
mostly highways-which are large enough to have viable alterna-
tives. 94 
85 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1974). A variation of this test 
is the "bandwagon" test, which focuses on whether a proposed project will have the effect of 
causing future actions to proceed by the project's own momentum. See Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 1975). 
86 Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1285. 
87 Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795 (9th Cir. 1975). 
88 Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1284-85. 
89Id. 
90 Cady, 527 F.2d at 795. 
91 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985). 
92 Id. 
93 See Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 440 (5th Cir. Unit B 
Feb. 1981). 
94 Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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The test has several criteria. To have independent utility, an action 
must fulfill its purpose. For example, if a highway is designed to 
provide access between two towns or other logical termini, the pro-
posed route cannot be segmented in order to avoid preparing an 
EIS; the segment of highway considered in one threshold determi-
nation must also have substantial independent utility without relying 
on other segments. 95 The segment must also be large enough to 
allow a broad scope of environmental consequences to be consid-
ered. 96 Similarly, when permitting the construction of power plants 
by public utilities, the Corps of Engineers requires EAs to consider 
the environmental effects of an entire plant, not merely a single 
segment such as an outfall pipe.97 
Courts also review independent utility cases to determine whether 
actions are proposed separately and whether they are designed to 
accomplish a single purpose. 98 For example, the fact that a state has 
an overall highway plan does not mean that the environmental effects 
of the entire plan must be considered together. Because highway 
plans are largely dependent on federal and state funding, and are 
subject to extensive modification, courts allow some degree of seg-
mentation,99 depending on the scope of the project.1oo The issue, 
thus, is not whether individual segments can be aggregated to form 
a highway system in which one segment facilitates movement onto 
other segments, but whether one segment has an independent pur-
pose even if related segments are not built. 101 
The above discussion of judicial tests includes the most widely-
used tests in existence for determining which actions must be con-
sidered together for NEPA purposes. The tests have similarities ,102 
but they occasionally conflict, resulting in situations in which the 
outcome of a case is determined by the test being applied. 103 It is 
95 Piedmont Heights, 637 F.2d at 440. 
96 Daly, 514 F.2d at 1109 (citing Federal Highway Administration criteria). 
97 33 C.F.R. § 230, app. B, ~ 8(a) (1986). 
98 Piedmont Heights, 637 F.2d at 440; see also Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 
(E.D. Va. 1972) (city's beltway cannot be segmented for NEPA purposes). 
99 See Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 19 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Taxpayers 
Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294,299--300 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (urban mass transit system). 
100 See Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1974) (river basin project). 
101 See Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
102 See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1242 (5th Cir. 1985) (comparing connected 
actions test of CEQ regulations and independent utility test); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 
513 F.2d 295, 299 nA (9th Cir. 1975) (comparing irrational or unwise test and irretrievable 
commitment test). 
103 See Note, Program Environmental Impact Statements: Review and Remedies, 75 MICH. 
L. REV. 107, 113-15 (1976) (arguing that the same fact situation could fail the irreversible 
commitment test but pass the independent utility test). 
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common for courts to apply more than one test to the same fact 
situation,104 or even to create hybrid tests.105 Compliance with one 
test, however, does not necessarily mean compliance with other 
tests. To comply with NEPA, agencies must follow their jurisdic-
tion's judicial test as well as the tests outlined in the CEQ regula-
tions. 106 
B. CEQ Tests 
The CEQ tests for determining which actions to consider together 
in one EIS are designed for use in the scoping process-the plural-
istic decisionmaking process held to determine the range of alter-
natives, effects, and actions to be considered in the EIS.l07 The 
process is used to reach a determination of significance. As discussed 
previously, the CEQ advocates the use of scoping where appropriate 
in making threshold determinations. 108 
The CEQ regulations require federal agencies to consider three 
types of actions in determining the scope of EISs: connected, cu-
mulative, and similar actions. 109 A fourth category of unconnected 
single actions is necessarily considered. 110 
1. Connected Actions 
The CEQ defines connected actions as closely related actions that: 
(1) automatically trigger other actions with a potentially significant 
effect on the environment, (2) are unable to or do not proceed without 
prior or simultaneous actions, or (3) are an interdependent part of a 
larger action justifying them. III 
One example of the use of the connected actions test is a court 
requiring the United States Forest Service to prepare an EIS on 
the environmental effects of road construction and timber sales in 
an area accessed by the road. 112 The court determined that the 
104 See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1306 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (applying independent utility test and irretrievable 
commitment test). 
105 See Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Mont. 1985) (creating "significant and 
irreversible impact" test from judicial precedent and CEQ regulations). 
106 See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758-60 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying CEQ regulations 
and Ninth Circuit precedents). 
107 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.25 (1986). 
lOB See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
109 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1986). 
lIO Id. 
lI1Id. 
112 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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proposals fulfilled the second and third criteria of the test because 
each action justified the other: the timber sale could not proceed 
without the road construction; justification for the road depended on 
timber sales. 113 The court, therefore, required the Forest Service to 
examine the potential environmental effects of the connected actions 
together. In another case involving timber sales and a Forest Service 
road, a court found that the actions were not connected. 114 The court 
declared that the road already existed even though it was not paved, 
it served interests other than timber harvesters, and timber sales 
were not sufficiently definite when the paving was proposed. 115 
2. Cumulative Actions 
Under the CEQ regulations, a proposed action is cumulative if it 
has cumulatively significant impacts when it is viewed with other 
proposed actions. 116 The leading case, and the basis for the CEQ 
regulation on cumulative actions, is Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 117 
Kleppe involved the issue of whether a comprehensive EIS was 
required for the Department of the Interior's coal mining activities 
on the Northern Great Plains. 118 The Department had prepared a 
comprehensive EIS for its nationwide coal-leasing program,119 as 
well as site-specific EISs for individual actions such as approval of 
mining plans and right-of-way permits. 120 The Sierra Club challenged 
the Department's failure to prepare a programmatic EIS for the 
Northern Great Plains region on the basis that coal-related activity 
in the area was environmentally, geographically, and programmati-
cally related. 121 
The Supreme Court rejected the Sierra Club's argument and up-
held the trial court's finding that existing and proposed coal devel-
opment projects in the region were not interrelated. 122 The Court 
stated in dicta that if the Department proposed a regional program 
with a cumulative or synergistic environmental impact, the agency 
must consider the environmental consequences of the program in 
one EIS, but that a comprehensive EIS *as not required for con-
113 I d. at 758-59. 
114 Vance v. Block, 635 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (D. Mont. 1986). 
115Id. 
116 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (1986). 
117427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
118Id. at 397-98. 
119Id. 
120 I d. at 399. 
121 I d. at 412. 
122Id. at 400-01. 
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templated actions. 123 The Court reasoned that requiring EISs for 
contemplated actions would result in the unnecessary preparation of 
a large number of EISs, as well as unwarranted judicial intrusion 
into day-to-day agency activities. l24 Although the Court noted with 
approval the Department's use of drainage areas and basins in de-
fining the geographic area to be included in individual EISs, it af-
firmed the broad discretion accorded agencies in defining the scope 
of their EISs.125 
The cumulative actions test differs from the connected actions test 
by focusing on the environment affected by an action rather than 
the type of action causing the impact. An action, therefore, may be 
cumulative even though it has independent utility. 126 
Courts apply the cumulative actions test to two types of deter-
minations: scoping (as in Kleppe) and threshold determinations. As 
detailed in the CEQ regulations,127 the test is designed for deter-
mining whether to prepare a comprehensive EIS in addition to site-
specific EISs. If an agency proposes various actions which are so 
interrelated that they comprise a 10cal,128 regional, or national pro-
gram,129 the agency must consider the effects of the cumulative 
actions in a comprehensive EIS. Because a central issue is whether 
a program in fact exists, cases often turn on that issue130 or on 
whether actions are proposed or contemplated. 131 
123 [d. at 410. 
124 [d. at 406. 
125 [d. at 412. 
126 See Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum on "Kleppe v. Sierra Club" and 
"Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n. of Oklahoma," 42 Fed. Reg. 61,069, 
61,070 (1977) [hereinafter CEQ Memorandum]. See also Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F. 
Supp. 778, 793 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (rejecting Corps of Engineers' argument that the ocean 
dumping projects were not interdependent in light of the cumulative or synergistic effect of 
the material being dumped at the same place). 
127 CEQ Memorandum, supra note 126. 
128 See Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.H. 
1979) (projects for different areas of airport complex were part of same action for NEPA 
purposes). • 
129 See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985); Committee for Auto 
Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F. Supp. 992, 1001 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 915 (1980); see also American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 833 
(D.D.C. 1980) (regulations concerning access of handicapped persons to federally assisted 
mass transit program comprise national program as defined by Kleppe). 
130 See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1976) (no regional plan for 
supply of hydorelectric power by Bonneville Power Administration exists); Peshlakai v. Dun-
can, 476 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (D. D.C. 1979) (no comprehensive plan exists for uranium mining 
and milling activities in New Mexico and Colorado). 
131 See South La. Envt'l Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir. 1980) (levee 
extension would have a cumulative environmental effect as well as a direct and significant 
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The cumulative actions test is less well-suited to threshold deter-
minations, for which the CEQ regulations specify using the cumu-
lative impacts test. 132 A determination of whether actions are cu-
mulative focuses on the proposed actions, whereas a determination 
of whether impacts are cumulative focuses on the resource affected 
by actions. Courts apply the cumulative actions test to threshold 
determinations by applying a different remedy and by varying the 
. criteria from those used in scoping decisions. 
If a court determines at the threshold level that an agency's action 
may have cumulatively significant effects, the agency must prepare 
an EIS analyzing those effects in lieu of preparing EAs and FONSIs 
for individual actions. 133 In making its decision, a court examines the 
agency's record for evidence of cumulative effects, including effects 
predicted by commenting agencies. l34 In addition to reviewing pro-
grammatic actions,135 courts also review repetitive actions which do 
not have significant environmental effects when examined individu-
ally.136 
The law is unsettled on which actions to consider in a cumulative 
actions analysis at the threshold level. For example, one court de-
termined that an agency did not have to consider contemplated 
projects outside its control when it was considering the proposed 
action on which the contemplated projects were based. 137 The court 
reasoned that the contemplated projects would be subject to envi-
ronmental review if they were subsequently proposed.l38 Another 
court determined that a one hundred page EA prepared for leasing 
an exploratory oil well in a national forest was adequate without 
impact on navigation channel, but does not require consideration because extension was only 
one of several flood protection schemes under consideration); Hart & Miller Islands Area 
Envt'l Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 505 F. Supp. 732, 754 (D. Md. 1980) (expansion of 
proposed dike is contemplated but not proposed). But see Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 1975) (action must be considered in EIS because, 
although it is not approved, it is beyond speculation stage). 
132 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 294~11 for a discus-
sion of cumulative effects. 
133 See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985). 
134 See id. (comments of other agencies suggested that road construction and timber sales 
would have cumulative environmental impact). 
135 See City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(construction of new postal facility and abandonment of old facility are cumulatively significant 
actions). 
136 See Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778, 793 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (repetitive 
dumping of dredged material on ocean dump site); Sierra Club v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120, 
129~0 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (repetitive channelization of watershed). 
137 Crounse Corp. v. ICC, 781 F.2d 1176, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1986). 
138 [d. at 1194-95. 
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discussion of the environmental effects of full field development. 139 
The court stated that such development was speculative and would 
receive further study under NEP A if it was subsequently pro-
posed. 140 In contrast, another court found that an EA and FONSI 
for an oil and gas lease in a different national forest was inadequate 
because it was in the first stage in a process which would have 
significant environmental effects. 141 
At the threshold level, a decision that actions are not cumulative 
means that EISs may not be prepared for any of the actions involved. 
The possibility that cumulative effects may not be analyzed in sub-
sequent EISs may be enough to change a court's decision. For 
yexample, in a scoping case involving an ocean dumping site used by 
the Corps of Engineers and its permittees, a court required prepa-
ration of a comprehensive EIS when EAs rather than site-specific 
EISs were sometimes prepared for individual actions. 142 
3. Similar Actions 
The CEQ defines similar actions as proposed or reasonably fore-
seeable agency actions with a common feature, such as timing or 
geography.143 If an agency determines that it is advantageous to 
consider the combined impacts of similar actions or reasonable al-
ternatives together, it may do so at its discretion. 144 Because the 
regulation is precatory, case law defining the regulation is scarce. 
Courts that have considered similar actions seem to use the regu-
lation as an additional factor in decisions ruling that the cumulative 
effects of several proposed actions must be considered together. 145 
139 Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 613 F. Supp. 1182 
(D. Wyo. 1985), aiI'd, 812 F.2d 609 (lOth Cir. 1987). The court noted that even though 
discussion of full field development was not required, the agency's environmental review 
included the discussion. [d. at 1188. 
140 [d. at 1187-88. 
HI Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107, 108-09 (D. Mont. 1985). See also Sierra Club v. 
Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409,1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (after oil and gas leases were issued for national 
forest, Forest Service could not prevent surface disturbing activities; therefore EA and 
FONSI were inappropriate because subsequent development may have significant environ-
mental effects). 
142 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Benn, 491 F. Supp. 1234, 1251-52 (S.D.N. Y. 1980). 
143 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3) (1986). 
144 [d. 
145 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 88-89 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (similarity of dredge dumping operation to others using the same ocean dump was 
one factor requiring cumulative environmental effects of actions to be considered together); 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 942 (D. Or. 1984) 
(federal timber sales and private timber harvesting on adjacent land were actions resulting 
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4. Unconnected Single Actions 
Unconnected single actions, or individual actions, are not defined 
by the CEQ. Their definition, however, can be determined by re-
versing the CEQ's definition of connected actions. Unconnected sin-
gle actions, therefore, are actions that: (1) do not automatically 
trigger other actions potentially requiring EISs, (2) are not inter-
dependent parts of larger actions on which they depend for their 
justification, and (3) do not require prior or simultaneous actions to 
be taken in order for them to proceed. 146 
Unconnected single actions are wide-ranging but can be roughly 
divided into two categories: entrepreneurial and regulatory ac-
tions. 147 Professor McGarity describes the federal agencies' entre-
preneurial actions as resource bestowing. 148 Construction and trans-
portation projects are entrepreneurial actions as are project grants 
to states and private parties, as well as the lease, sale, or donation 
of federally owned resources. 149 Regulatory actions, meanwhile, en-
compass agency rule making activities affecting classes of activities 
as well as adjudicatory actions such as granting individual permits. 150 
C. Actions Affecting the Status Quo 
A difficult problem occasionally faced by agencies is determining 
whether an action changes the status quo sufficiently to trigger 
NEP A. Decisions vary according to individual situations. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's re-
licensing of a hydropower dam on the Columbia River was a change 
in the status quO. 151 The court applied the irretrievable commitment 
in similar cumulative threats to fish habitat), order vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 801 
F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986). 
146 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 112-14 for a 
discussion of the distinction between unconnected single actions and connected actions. 
147 See McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV. 
801, 840 (1977). 
148 I d. at 840-41. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); see also 
Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Dravo Basic 
Materials Co. v. Louisiana, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986) (renewal of shell dredging permits is not 
maintenance of status quo because damage could spread beyond currently affected area; if 
permits were not renewed, benthos could recover), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986). 
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test to determine that an EIS was required. 152 The dam, which had 
been licensed for many years, was to be relicensed for forty years. 153 
In a case involving a bridge to a barrier island, however, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that the status quo included the twenty-four year 
old bridge before its destruction by a hurricane. l54 The new bridge 
was similar in design to the destroyed bridge. 155 In another case 
involving construction of a fishing pier in an area already used for 
fishing, a court agreed with the Environmental Protection Agency 
that the new pier would not significantly affect the environment. 156 
One factor considered was the continuation of the existing use of the 
area. 157 
IV. NATURE OF EFFECTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THRESHOLD 
DETERMINATIONS 
The CEQ regulations require EISs to consider direct and indirect 
effects.158 The effects may be ecological, aesthetic, cultural, eco-
nomic, social, health-related, or historic resources. They may be 
beneficial as well as detrimental. 159 Direct and indirect effects may 
also be cumulative. The difference in considering direct and indirect 
effects and in considering cumulative impacts is that a .cumulative 
impacts analysis requires consideration of the effects of other ac-
tions. Consideration of the direct and indirect effects of an action is 
limited to the proposed action. 160 Because a threshold determination 
focuses on identifying whether environmental effects are significant, 
not whether they are direct or indirect, categorization of actions 
under direct or indirect effects in an EA or EIS is not mandatory, 
although consideration of them is. 161 
152 Confederated Tribes, 746 F.2d at 476. 
153 [d. at 476-77. 
154 Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Committee for Auto 
Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (change in lessee of gov-
ernment parking lot does not change status if government's parking policy remains the same), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980). 
ISS Hassell, 636 F.2d at 1099. 
166 Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, 5 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1007, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
157 [d. 
158 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16(aHb) (1986). 
159 [d. § 1508.8. 
160 Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1246 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra text accompanying 
notes 116-42 (cumulative actions) and supra text accompanying notes 116-142 (cumulative 
needs). 
161 See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). 
1987] THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS 79 
A. Direct Effects 
Direct effects occur at the same time and place as a proposed 
action, and are caused by it. 162 Examples include increased traffic 
caused by the change in location of jobs, urban blight caused by 
abandonment of inner city facilities, and inner city residents moving 
to the suburbs because of the loss of job opportunities. 163 If the effect 
of the action will be offset by preexisting conditions in the area, 
however, the potential pressures may be shown to be nonexistent. 
For example, the potential pressure on services caused by the cre-
ation of new jobs may be offset by high unemployment in the area. 164 
Similarly, the potential increase in development pressure caused by 
expanding a county's sewage treatment system may be offset by an 
overburdening of the county's existing system. 165 
The common denominator in the above examples of direct effects 
is their threat to an area's physical resources. 166 If the threat is to 
an area's socioeconomic environment, however, the position changes. 
The CEQ does not require preparation of an EIS if the only effects 
of a proposed action are socioeconomic. 167 Thus, if the only effect of 
closing an air force base would be local unemployment, an EIS is 
not required. 168 If an action's physical effect on the environment 
requires preparation of an EIS, however, socioeconomic effects may 
also need to be considered. 169 
162 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a) (1986). 
163 City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967,973 (2d Cir. 1976). 
164 See Brandon v. Pierce, 725 F.2d 555, 563 (10th Cir. 1984). 
165 See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1099 (1984). 
160 See Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1982). 
167 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1986). See Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States 
Dep't of Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). 
168 Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978). See 
also Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864, 865 (6th Cir. 1976) (reduction in jobs and 
transfers of personnel from army depot does not require EIS), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 
(1977); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowner's Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147, 149-50 (N.D. Ill. 
1973) (socioeconomic characteristics of occupants of proposed low-income housing project are 
not an environmental effect of construction of the project), afl'd, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976). 
169 The CEQ regulations require the consideration of socioeconomic effects if an action has 
a physical effect on the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1986). However, the Eighth Circuit 
considers that the Supreme Court decision of Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against 
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), may have read the requirement out of existence. 
Olmstead Citizens for a Better Community v. United States, 793 F.2d 201, 206 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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B. Indirect Effects 
Indirect effects are also caused by an action but are reasonably 
foreseeable effects occurring at a later time and greater distance. 
Examples of indirect effects are "growth inducing effects and other 
effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, popu-
lation density or growth rate, and related effects on air and water 
and other natural systems, including ecosystems."170 The lost value 
to science, education, and recreation of destroyed resources is an 
indirect effect, as is the public's loss of knowledge that the resource 
exists.171 Although the CEQ regulations tend to aggregate indirect 
effects, the effects should also be considered individually where 
appropriate. 172 
In making a threshold determination, an agency should identify 
all known indirect effects in addition to an action's direct effects. 
The CEQ recognizes that some indirect effects may be uncertain, 
but encourages agencies to make a good faith attempt to identify 
those effects which are reasonably foreseeable. 173 In other words, 
there must be a "reasonably close causal relationship between a 
change in the physical environment and the effect at issue."174 Agen-
cies do not need to consider highly speculative or indefinite effects. 175 
In identifying which effects are too speculative, agencies should 
consider: (1) the degree of confidence in predicting the effects' oc-
currence; (2) the available knowledge with which to describe the 
impacts in a manner useful to the decisionmaker; and (3) the feasi-
bility of the decisionmaker meaningfully considering an analysis of 
environmental effects later in the action without being obligated to 
continue the action because of past commitments. 176 
Applying the above test, the indirect effects of an action would 
not be too speculative if the action would necessarily result in de-
velopment of an area, and the development pattern could be de-
scribed based on existing plans or trends.177 For example, if an 
170 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). 
171 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1322 & n.27 (8th Cir. 1974). 
172 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 878 (1st Cir. 1985). 
173 NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,031. 
174 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983). 
175 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 878. 
176 [d. Cf. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1974) ( no significant 
change in land use patterns or population trends shown when no plan existed and no probability 
of change was demonstrated). 
177 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 878-80. 
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agency action is a stepping stone to an area's development,178 or 
necessarily accelerates development,179 the action's indirect effects 
are reasonably foreseeable. Similarly, if an agency contracts to sup-
ply power to a company, the environmental effects of the company's 
use of that power are reasonably foreseeable. 180 Effects may be too 
speculative if they involve an additional step, however, even if that 
step is reasonably foreseeable. For example, an increase in Hawaii's 
permanent population resulting from an increase in tourism was too 
speculative to be an indirect effect of enlarging an airport, even 
though the increase in tourism was reasonably foreseeable. 181 
If an indirect action is not too remote, its environmental effects 
must be considered in a threshold determination and analyzed in an 
EIS if one is required. 182 Remoteness is generally identified in terms 
of the probability of environmental effects occurring and the causal 
chain between the effects and an action, not the amount of time 
between an action and the occurrence of its direct effects on the 
environment. 183 Because of the speculative nature of indirect effects, 
the analysis of environmental effects need not be as detailed as when 
they are known. 184 
As in direct effects, the significance of an agency's action may be 
offset by preexisting conditions in the area. For example, the growth 
inducing potential of a rural water system may be offset by local 
zoning regulations requiring development projects to comply with 
local standards. 185 Similarly, the development triggering potential of 
a new highway project may be offset by the constraining effect of 
the infrastructure servicing the highway. 186 
178 See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975). See Colorado River 
Indian River Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
179 Conservation Council of N. Carolina v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 672 (E.D.N.C. 1975), 
afl'd, 528 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975). 
180 Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,657, 20,660 (D. Ore. 
1975). See also National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(effects of planned recreational development on land to be exchanged by Forest Service must 
be considered under NEPA). 
181 Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 
961 (1974). See also Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091 (D.C. Cir.) (possibility 
that deranged criminal would inject poison through walls of plastic bottles was not a significant 
environmental effect of permitting use of bottles), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984). 
182 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1985). 
183 See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 
1079, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
184 Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985). 
185 See Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 F. Supp. 427, 432 (D. S.D. 1978). 
186 See Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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V. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT 
"Significance" is an amorphous term neither defined in NEP A nor 
its legislative history.187 The CEQ has recommended applying the 
term in order to avoid unanticipated environmental effects. l88 Pro-
fessor McGarity, meanwhile, advocates that a determination of sig-
nificance should be related to the need for information concerning 
the action's environmental effects.189 One court defined the term as 
"[a]ny action that substantially affects, beneficially or detrimentally, 
the depth or course of streams, plant life, wildlife habitats, fish and 
wildlife, and the soil and air" as well as "actions having an important 
or meaningful effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of aspects 
of the human environment .... "190 Other courts do not attempt a 
definition but merely state that an action is significant. 191 Because 
NEPA requires conclusions to be based on evidence and analysis, 
however, challengers to an agency's determination of nonsignificance 
may not simply conclude that an effect may be significant. 192 Whether 
a court specifies the criteria it uses or not, if all potentially significant 
consequences have been considered, the threshold determination is 
a question of fact, not law. 193 Cases, therefore, tend to be determined 
on an ad hoc basis. 
To aid the agencies in identifying those actions which may have 
significant environmental effects, the CEQ published a list of crite-
187 See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(1973); Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: Third Annual Report 231 
(1972). 
188 Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: Third Annual Report 231 
(1972). 
189 McGarity, supra note 147, at 848; accord Citizens Against 2, 4-D v. Watt, 527 F. Supp. 
465, 468 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141, 154 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
190 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C. 
1972). See also Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 389 F. Supp. 167, 174 (D.D.C. 1974) (interpreting 
"significantly affecting" as "having a reasonably substantial relationship to the quality of the 
environment"), a/i'd, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
191 See, e.g., Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1053 (5th Cir. 1985) ("we have 
no doubt that the potential effect of the [action] is 'significant"'); City of West Chicago v NRC, 
701 F.2d 632, 650 (7th Cir. 1983) (action "clearly will have a significant impact on the environ-
ment"); City of Davis v. Coleman, 621 F.2d 661, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1975) ("it is obvious that 
constructing [a highway in an undeveloped area] will have a substantial impact on a number 
of environmental factors"). 
192 See Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 
747 (3d Cir. 1982). 
193 Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1248 (5th Cir. 1985); Town of Orangetown V. 
Gorsuch 718 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Vine Street 
Concerned Citizens, Inc. V. Dole, 630 F. Supp. 24, 28 (E.D. Pa 1985). 
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ria. l94 These criteria, based on CEQ's reading of the case law minus 
marginal decisions,195 have two divisions--eontext and intensity-
both of which must be considered in threshold determinations. 196 
A. Context of an Action 
Agencies determine the context of an action by analyzing it in 
relation to its setting-local, regional, and/or national-and the in-
terests it affects. The context of an action is also influenced by the 
short- and long-term nature of its effects. 197 
1. Local or Regional Effects 
A project's locale plays a critical role in determining whether an 
environmental effect is significant. Locale is determined by the ge-
ography of an area and the nature of an action. l98 For example, if 
an action will destroy habitat, the significance of the loss will not be 
determined in relation to the extent of the habitat in general. In-
stead, the locale for a site-specific action is the area directly affected 
by the action plus its immediate surroundings. 199 
The condition of the site where the activity will take place is also 
relevant. If an area is damaged by past government actions, but has 
the potential to reestablish itself, a determination of significance is 
not qualified by the current state of the environment.200 Alterna-
tively, if the agency's action will stabilize the area's environment by 
relieving pressure on organisms such as animals or plants, the action 
may be considered nonsignificant. 201 If the action's environmental 
effects will be mitigated because of natural conditions occurring at 
the same time, the action's effect may be insignificant. For example, 
the effect of road salt entering streams may be offset by the high 
water flows of spring runoff. 202 
If a project affects a natural resource that is prevalent over a 
large area without clearly identifiable boundaries, the locale of the 
194 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1986). 
195 See Note, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 347, 362 (1979). 
196 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1986). 
197 [d. § 1508.27(a). 
198 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 881 (5th Cir. 1985). 
199 [d. 
200 Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1981, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985), cen. denied sub nom. Dravo Basic 
Materials Co. v. Louisiana, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986). 
201 American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206, 1219 (D. Nev. 1975). 
202 See Mont Vernon Preservation Soc'y v. Climents, 415 F. Supp. 141, 148 (D.N.H. 1976). 
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action may be less critical. For example, a court determined that 
the adverse impact of a Corps of Engineers' dredging program on 
benthic organisms was insignificant because of the vast area inhab-
ited by the organisms which would not be affected and the lack of 
any threatened or endangered species in the affected area. 203 
Although local opposition to a project will not make an insignificant 
effect become significant,204 the project's effect on a local community 
may trigger the EIS process if challengers to the action can show 
that the community and its inhabitants may be harmed. 205 The harm 
may include a deterioration in the quality of life caused by a con-
struction project,206 a substantial decrease in a community's tax 
base,207 or a change in the character of one of the community's 
neighborhoods.208 The effect need not be significant when viewed in 
the context of the agency's entire action as long as it is shown to be 
significant to the community. 209 
2. Short- or Long-Term Effects 
The fact that an agency's temporary action has short-term effects 
is insufficient, standing alone, to make those effects insignificant. 210 
If the action continues a long trend of environmental deterioration, 
the action's environmental significance is not lessened because of 
that deterioration. 211 Thus, a discussion of temporary effects in an 
EIS has been adjudged adequate when environmental effects were 
shown to be similar to those occurring in nature, and when displaced 
organic communities were shown to have the potential to repopulate 
within a short period with only minimal long-term damage.212 The 
temporary effects on the scenic qualities of a river caused by oper-
203 Louisiana ex rei. Guste v. Lee, 635 F. Supp. 1107, 1121-22 (E.D. La. 1986). 
204 See Mont Vernon, 415 F. Supp. at 148. See infra text accompanying notes 241-50 
(controversiality factor). 
205 See Mont Vernon, 415 F. Supp. at 147-49. Effects of Highway reconstruction project 
through community were not significant because plaintiffs did not show harm to town's 
economy or ambiance. Id. at 149. 
206 See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) 
(proposed jail construction). 
207 Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 449 (3d Cir. 1983). 
208 Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (D. Or. 1971). 
209 Township of Springfield, 702 F.2d at 449 n.48. See also Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 
F. Supp. 100, III (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (assessing significance in context of size of affected area 
and life styles of its inhabitants). 
210 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 635 F. Supp. 1107, 1121 (E.D. La. 1986). 
211 See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1091, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub. nom. Dravo 
Basic Materials Co. v. Louisiana, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986). 
212 Pack v. Corps of Eng'rs, 428 F. Supp. 460, 466 (M.D. Fla. 1977). 
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ating a barge fleeting facility were also adjudged insignificant when 
the facility's eventual removal was shown not to damage the river's 
scenic qualities. 213 
B. Intensity of an Action 
An action's significance is measured by its intensity as well as its 
context. The intensity of an action is the severity of its impact. 214 
The CEQ lists ten criteria for determining whether an action's po-
tential environmental effects are severe enough to be significant. In 
evaluating intensity agencies should consider the action's: (1) bene-
ficial or adverse effects; (2) effect on public health and safety; (3) 
effect on a unique geographical area; (4) controversial effects on the 
human environment; (5) uncertain, unique, or unknown risks; (6) 
precedential effects; (7) cumulative effects; (8) effect on historic, 
scientific, or cultural resources; (9) effect on endangered species; and 
(10) compliance with federal, state, or local law. 215 The criteria pro-
vide a framework for making threshold determinations which is 
widely used by federal agencies. The fact that an environmental 
effect may be classified under one or more of the criteria does not 
mean that it is necessarily significant,216 but courts may use the 
criteria as examples of factors requiring consideration in a threshold 
determination. 217 
Some agencies publish further guidance on defining when an action 
is significant. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration includes the following additional criteria for fishery 
management plans and amendments: 
(1) The proposed action may be reasonably expected to jeopar-
dize the long-term productive capability of any stocks that may 
be affected by the action. 
(2) The proposed action may be reasonably expected to allow 
substantial damage to the ocean and coastal habitats. 
(4) The proposed action may be reasonably expected to affect 
adversely an endangered or threatened species or a marine mam-
mal population. 
213 See River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986). 
214 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (1986). 
215Id. 
216 See Puna Speaks v. Hodel, 562 F. Supp. 82, 85 (D. Haw. 1983). 
217 See Found. on Economic Trends V. Weinberger, 610 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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(5) The proposed action may be reasonably expected to result in 
cumulative adverse effects that could have a substantial effect 
on the target resource species or any related stocks that may be 
affected. 218 
The Department of Interior expands the criteria involving an 
area's unique character to require consideration of wilderness areas, 
sole or principal drinking water aquifers, and ecologically significant 
areas, in addition to the areas detailed by the CEQ.219 The Minerals 
Management Service of the Department of the Interior requires 
consideration of the effects of activities described in a development 
plan, including the probable construction of new onshore processing, 
storage, treatment, or transportation facilities resulting from off-
shore development and its effect on the marine, coastal, and human 
environment. In addition, adverse effects with a greater magnitude, 
duration, or nature from those previously analyzed must be consid-
ered. 220 
1. Beneficial or Adverse Effects 
Recognizing that environmental impacts may be simultaneously 
beneficial and adverse, the CEQ regulations require consideration 
of both effects in threshold determinations even if an agency believes 
the effect is more beneficial than adverse. 221 The focus of the deter-
mination is on whether either effect may be significant. Beneficial 
economic effects of an action cannot be balanced against adverse 
environmental effects at the threshold determination stage. 222 If a 
beneficial effect may be significant, it must be discussed in an EIS.223 
2. Effect on Public Health and Safety 
The CEQ regulations require consideration of the degree to which 
a proposed action affects the public health or safety.224 Public health 
was identified in NEPA's legislative history as a primary reason for 
218 Revised NOAA Directives, supra note 10, at 29,656. 
219 Revised Procedures, supra note 10, at 21,439. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(3) (1986) 
(discussed infra in text accompanying note 234). 
22() 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-4(c) (1986). 
221 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(I) (1986). See also Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 
421,427 (5th Cir. 1973) (NEPA mandates consideration of all potential environmental effects); 
Goose Holow Foothill League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D. Or. 1971) (agency must 
consider all significant effects, beneficial as well as adverse). 
222 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 880 (1st Cir. 1985). 
228 Environmental Defense Fund V. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. 1981). 
224 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(2) (1986). 
1987] THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS 87 
NEPA's enactment,225 and has been referred to as the most impor-
tant subject covered by the Act. 226 
Although physical health is definitely within NEP A's ambit, it is 
unclear whether psychological health is also included. The problem 
lies not with a distinction between physical and psychological health, 
but with the causal chain between a physical effect on the environ-
ment and its effect on psychological health. For example, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the causal chain between restarting a nuclear 
reactor at Three Mile Island and the effect on residents' psycholog-
ical health posed by the risk of an accident was too attenuated to be 
covered by NEP A. 227 Similarly, the effect on residents' psychological 
health of constructing a jailor low-income housing in a neighborhood 
is too attenuated to be within the scope of NEP A.228 
While NEP A may not cover psychological health, it does include 
beneficial psychological effects. The quality of life is within NEP A's 
scope,229 as is the public's awareness that a resource exists.230 Aes-
thetic values are also included. 231 Because of their subjective nature, 
aesthetic effects do not require preparation of statistical analyses. 232 
Aesthetic effects rarely trigger the duty to prepare an EIS unless 
combined with other potentially significant effects. 233 
3. Unique Character of an Effect 
In making a threshold determination, the CEQ regulations require 
consideration of a geographic area's unique characteristics. 234 Unique 
225 115 Congo Rec. 19,009 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson) ("What is involved is a congres-
sional declaration that we do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions 
which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind .... An environmental 
policy is a policy for people. Its primary concern is with man and his future."). 
226 Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 927 (D. Or. 1971). 
227 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 775 (1983). 
228 [d. at 776-77. 
229 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1972), eert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
See also Highland Cooperative v. City of Lansing, 492 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (W.D. Mich. 1980) 
(highway construction would potentially affect quality of life of community). 
230 Minnesota Pub. Information Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1322 n.27 (8th Cir. 
1974). 
231 See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 
F.2d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 
1334 (D. Haw. 1976) (recognizing "undeniably significant aesthetic consequences" of construct-
ing a 7-10 foot high wall, 150 feet out to sea for a discharge facility). 
232 City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925, 930 (D. Conn. 1978). 
233 River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), em. 
denied 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1985). 
234 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(30) (1986). 
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characteristics include the area's proximity to historic or cultural 
resources, prime farmlands, park lands, wild and scenic rivers, wet-
lands, or ecologically critical areas.235 For example, an EA and 
FONSI were declared inadequate because they did not consider the 
environmental and social effects of an expanded highway project in 
Dallas, Texas.236 The expanded highway's increased proximity to a 
popular city park and several historic properties would have affected 
the area's use because of the highway's visual, aesthetic and noise 
effects. 237 
Any effect on an area's unique characteristics, however, will not 
trigger an agency's duty to prepare an EIS. The effect must signif-
icantly affect the unique characteristic. 238 If the action continues an 
existing use, the effect may be nonsignificant. For example, when 
the major change between old and new roads through parkland is 
only increased traffic capacity, the proposed road construction may 
not necessarily have a significant effect on the parkland.239 Although 
an action's effect upon an area's unique character may trigger an 
EIS, an effect may be significant even though no unique character-
istics exist. For example, if an area's pollution problems are so 
severe that another pollution source would "represent the straw that 
breaks the back of the environmental camel" the effect may be 
significant. 240 
4. Controversiality of an Effect 
In making threshold determinations, agencies should consider the 
degree to which the environmental effects of their proposed actions 
may be controversial. 241 The term "controversial" applies to the 
environmental effects, nature, and size of a proposed action, not to 
the proposed action itself.242 Thus, if opposition to a proposed action 
exists but the nature of its effects is not disputed, one court has 
235Id. 
236 Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 435--36 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
237 Id. 
238 See Town of Orange town v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29,36--37 (2d Cir. 1983) (effect on wetlands 
of expansion of sewage treatment system was not significant), eert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 
(1984). 
239 See Falls Road Impact Comm. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678, 696 (E.D. Wis.), a/I'd, 737 
F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1984). 
240 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,831 (2d Cir. 1972), eert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
241 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1986). 
242 Hanly, 471 F.2d at 830; see also Revised NOAA Directive, supra note 10, at 29,647 
(controversial does not refer to the propriety of a proposed action). 
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ruled that the CEQ regulations do not require the opposition to be 
a factor in determining the effects' significance. 243 
Individual agencies, however, may recommend factoring local op-
position to a project into a decision to prepare an EIS. For example, 
NOAA recommends considering the controversial nature of an action 
in a threshold determination.244 Controversiality is partially deter-
mined by consideration of socioeconomic factors. 245 
The controversiality criteria is useful in triggering an EIS in 
marginal cases where the duty to prepare an EIS is unclear.246 To 
trigger the regulation, however, opponents of a projected action 
must provide evidence showing the existence of a scientific contro-
versy about the action's environmental effects; mere speculation is 
insufficient to make an action's effects controversial. 247 Such evidence 
can consist of disagreements with a nonsignificance determination 
by other agencies and knowledgeable members of the public. 248 If a 
court finds controversy over the effects of an action, the potential 
uncertainty of the effects triggers the CEQ regulation on uncertain, 
unique, or unknown risks. 249 If opposition to a project does not occur, 
an agency may not conclude that the action lacks significance; lack 
of opposition is not necessarily lack of significance. 250 
5. Uncertain, Unique, or Unknown Risks 
The CEQ regulations require agencies to consider the degree to 
which the possible environmental effects of their actions are highly 
uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks. 251 The procedures to 
be followed if information is incomplete or unavailable after a deci-
sion has been made to prepare an EIS have been subject to dispute 
243 See Bosco v. Beck, 475 F. Supp. 1029, 1038 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980). 
244 Revised NOAA Directive, supra note 10, at 29,656. 
245Id. 
246 Lynch, The 1973 CEQ Guidelines: Cautious Updating of the Environmental Impact 
Statement Process, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 297, 312 n.83 (1975). 
247 See Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1099 (1974). 
248 See Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep V. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 
1182 (9th Cir. 1982). 
249 See Jones V. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Alaska 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
nonpertinent part, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986). See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1986) (discussed 
infra in text accompanying notes 251-89). 
250 See Mahelona V. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (D. Haw. 1976). 
251 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1986). 
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during the past few years. The dispute has also raised questions of 
whether a worst case analysis must be prepared in an EA. 
The CEQ regulations formerly mandated preparation of a worst 
case analysis when scientific uncertainty existed.252 If scientific un-
certainty or gaps in relevant information were discovered by an 
agency when it was "evaluating significant adverse effects on the 
human environment" the uncertainty and/or gaps had to be dis-
closed. 253 If the relevant unavailable information was "essential to a 
reasoned choice among alternatives and . . . the overall costs of 
obtaining it [were] not exorbitant," the information had to be in-
cluded in the EIS.254 
If the costs were exorbitant, or if important information was 
unavailable because it was beyond the state-of-the-art, the agency 
was to "weigh the need for the action against the risk and severity 
of possible adverse impacts were the action to proceed in the face of 
uncertainty. "255 A decision to proceed obligated the agency to include 
a worst case analysis in the EIS, together with an indication of the 
probability of the adverse impacts occurring.256 In essence, the worst 
case analysis regulation addressed agency actions with the potential 
for low probability but catastrophic environmental consequences, 
where important information regarding such consequences was un-
known or conflicting. If an agency's actions involved a leap into the 
unknown, the worst environmental consequences of that leap had to 
be analyzed. 257 
The CEQ withdrew the worst case analysis regulation in 1986.258 
The new regulation requires that, if unavailable information is "es-
sential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and . . . the overall 
costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant," the information must be 
included in the EIS.259 This requirement, which was contained in the 
old regulation, has not been changed. 
The new regulation also provides that if the costs of obtaining the 
information are exorbitant, or if important information is unavailable 
252 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) (superseded). 
253 [d. 
254 [d. § 1502.22(a). 
255 [d. § 1502.22(b). 
256 [d. 
257 See Yost, Don't Gut Worst Case Analysis, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,394, 
10,394 (1983). 
258 See Council on Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; 
Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (1986) [hereinafter NEPA Reg-
ulations-Incomplete Information]. 
259 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (1986). 
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because it is beyond the state-of-the-art, the agency must: disclose 
the fact that information is incomplete or unavailable; state the 
relevance of such information; summarize "credible scientific evi-
dence" relevant to an evaluation of reasonably foreseeable significant 
adverse impacts; and evaluate the impacts by the use of "theoretical 
approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific 
community. "260 "Reasonably foreseeable" is defined to include envi-
ronmental effects of low probability but catastrophic consequences 
if an analysis of such effects "is supported by credible scientific 
evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of 
reason. "261 
It is not yet clear what the practical difference will be between 
the new regulation and the old regulation. Arguably, the analysis 
mandated by the old regulation will continue to be required in order 
for federal agencies to comply with NEP A case law. 262 For example, 
scientific uncertainty263 and significant scientific risks264 must be dis-
closed and weighed in a decision to proceed with an action.265 A good 
faith effort to describe reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts 
must be made even if it requires speculation.266 If significant envi-
ronmental effects are the subject of scientific conflict, an EIS must 
disclose the uncertainty by including "responsible opposing views. "267 
Courts generally defer to an agency's decision about which scientific 
opinion the agency chooses268 unless the agency's discussion of sci-
entific data is cursory and conclusive. 269 
260 Id. § 1502.22(b). 
261Id. 
262 The Ninth Circuit considers that the old regulation codified prior case law. Oregon 
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058 n.8 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, 
continued compliance with the requirements of the withdrawn regulation is required in at 
least the Ninth Circuit. 
263 See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 
1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); See Save the Niobrara River Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 844, 
852 (D. Neb. 1979). 
264 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 100 
(1983). 
265 Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, sub 
nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978). See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 
1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985). 
266 Scientists Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1092. 
267 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
268 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 103; Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 160 (4th 
Cir. 1983). 
269 Association Concerned About Tomorrow, Inc. v. Dole, 610 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (N.D. 
Tex. 1985). 
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The new CEQ regulation is directly opposed to a Ninth Circuit 
ruling that worst case analyses are required in EAs.270 The EAs at 
issue in the Ninth Circuit cases, however, were not the type used 
to make traditional threshold determinations. Instead, the EAs were 
used for individual actions in a comprehensive program. After NEP A 
procedures had been followed for the broad program, EAs were 
prepared for individual actions within that program.271 Thus, if the 
environmental concerns at issue had been adequately considered in 
the comprehensive EIS, the EAs could have "tiered" to that EIS, 
eliminating the necessity for further consideration of the concerns.272 
In effect, the EAs were functional equivalents of EISs. 
If courts extend the Ninth Circuit rule of requiring worst case 
analysis in EAs that are the functional equivalent of EISs to EAs 
used in threshold determinations, the new CEQ regulation could 
affect threshold determinations involving uncertainty. Arguably, 
however, NEPA's full disclosure mandate273 means that compliance 
with the more stringent provisions of the old regulation would still 
be required. 274 
Some courts have established a framework for considering scien-
tific uncertainty in threshold determinations. These courts weigh the 
probability of an adverse environmental effect or a risk against its 
270 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986). See NEPA Regulations-Incomplete Information, supra note 
258, at 15,625. The superseded regulation did not mention that worst case analyses were 
required in EAs. 
271 Southern Ore. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1480-81 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 (1984) (EAs were prepared for annual spraying; EIS 
had been prepared for 1O-year spraying program); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States 
Forest Serv., 643 F. Supp. 653, 653 (D. Or. 1984) (amended judgment), vacated in part and 
appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986) (EAs were prepared for timber sales; court 
ordered EIS prepared for area's timber sale program). 
272 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1986); see Texas v. United States Forest Serv., 654 F. Supp. 289, 
298 (S.D. Tex. 1986). 
273 See Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 594 (9th Cir. 
1981); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (lst Cir. 1973). 
274 Under the new regulation, federal agencies could conceivably exclude from consideration 
scientific evidence they believed to be incredible. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986) (analysis 
must be "supported by credible scientific evidence"). However, although courts traditionally 
defer to agency expertise on determinations involving evidence at the cutting edge of science, 
they require agencies to have adequately considered the scientific evidence in dispute. Foun-
dation for Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Reserve 
Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1975) (defer-
ring to agency decision involving evidence at the "frontiers of scientific knowledge"). Thus, 
agencies that do not consider scientific evidence because they believe it to be incredible may 
be faced with a court making the credibility determination for them. See Save Our Ecosystems 
v. Watt, 13 Envtl. L.R. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,887, 20,888 (1983), a/I'd in part and rev'd in part 
sub nom. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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severity. Under this analysis, if scientific uncertainty exists regard-
ing whether a risk has significant environmental effects, the deter-
mination of whether the risk itself is significant may turn upon its 
probability. In New York v. United States Department of Transpor-
tation, the Second Circuit upheld the Department of Transporta-
tion's decision not to prepare an EIS for transporting radioactive 
materials by highway through urban areas. 275 The agency concluded, 
and the court agreed, that the certain consequences of the action 
were insignificant.276 The court stated that agencies must consider 
possible environmental effects of their actions, but because the ef-
fects involved scientific uncertainty, it deferred to the agency's de-
termination that the risk of accidentally releasing radioactive ma-
terials in an urban area was too remote to require an EIS.277 Because 
the issue involved a threshold decision, the court stated that it was 
precluded from imposing its choice of risk analysis on the agency. 278 
The agency could select its own methodology for risk assessment as 
long as it was justified in light of current scientific opinion. 279 The 
District of Columbia Circuit had adopted a similar test. The court 
requires agencies to determine the sum of all reasonably foreseeable 
effects which can be feasibly determined. 280 The probability of the 
effects occurring is then discounted from the determination, to cal-
culate whether the effects are significant. 281 The detail accompanying 
consideration of each effect is based on the remoteness of the effect 
and the severity of its potential environmental effects. 282 
Although an agency may not be obligated to prepare an EIS if 
significant environmental effects would only occur in the event of a 
remote risk, the agency must fully discuss the basis for its deter-
mination of nonsignificance in the EA. Failure to address environ-
mental concerns because of their speculative nature, ~83 or because 
they are unknown,284 is inadequate because a potential environmen-
tal effect cannot be determined to be nonsignificant unless it is 
275 715 F.2d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1983), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). 
276 I d. at 752. 
277Id. at 746 n.14, 752. 
278Id. at 75l. 
279Id. 
280 Potomac Alliance v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 682 F.2d 1030, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
see also Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir 1975) 
(recommending that probabilities be considered as well as consequences). 
281 Potomac Alliance, 682 F.2d at 1037 n.36. 
282 Id. 
283 American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 833 (D. D.C. 1980). 
284 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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known. The EA must discuss relevant data. 285 If an assessment 
cannot predict reliable results unless inventories are conducted in 
the areas where the action is scheduled, the inventories must be 
completed before the threshold determination is made.286 In a deci-
sion regarding an EIS, however, a lengthy study of biological effects 
was not required when an agency determined that the physical 
effects of its action were minor.287 The court determined that the 
agency had adequately identified the scientific uncertainty inherent 
in its decision as well as describing potential biological problems 
resulting from the physical effects. 288 
If an agency decided to conduct a test to evaluate the environ-
mental effects of a contemplated action, the potential significance of 
the test's effects would have to be considered under NEPA. In a 
test involving the use of an airstrip, a court determined that the 
environmental effects were insignificant because the experts con-
cluded that no long-range effects on health would occur if the test 
ended when stated, the length of the test was reasonable to fulfill 
its purposes, and actual testing was more accurate than computer 
modeling. 289 
6. Precedential Nature of an Effect 
The effects of actions which may establish a precedent for future 
actions with significant effects or which represent "a decision in 
principle about a future consideration" must be evaluated in deter-
mining an effect's intensity.290 This type of effect can occur when 
construction of a facility-such as a port-ensures that an area will 
continue to be developed in lieu of other areas. 291 Similarly, continued 
investment in a project makes it increasingly difficult for decision-
makers to order the project stopped-as in offshore oil and gas 
leasing programs. 292 EISs may be required for further stages of the 
285 Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172,1178 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
286 Jones v. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D. Alaska 1985), a/I'd in part and rev'd in 
nonpertinent part, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Save the Niobrara River Ass'n v. 
Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 844, 860-61 (D. Neb. 1979) (requiring inclusion in EIS of inventory of 
wildlife and wildlife habitat in area affected by proposed dam). 
287 Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 375-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Marsh, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 
288 Id. 
289 City of Irving v. FAA, 539 F. Supp. 17, 29~1 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
290 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6) (1986). 
291 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 879 (lst Cir. 1985). 
292 See Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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project, but the commitment of resources stimulates further stages 
being agreed to by the decisionmaker.293 
7. Cumulative Effects 
When agencies make a threshold determination, they must con-
sider whether the proposed "action is related to other actions with 
individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts,"294 
that is, whether the environmental effects of the action under con-
sideration will be significant when the effects are considered together 
with the environmental effects of other actions. If the agency deter-
mines that a cumulatively significant impact on the environment can 
be reasonably anticipated, significance exists.295 Similarly, if the sum 
of the cumulative effects plus the project's direct effects may result 
in a significant environmental impact, significance exists. 296 
The CEQ's definition of cumulative effects is considerably broader 
than its definition of cumulative actions. Cumulative actions include 
only related actions proposed by the federal agency proposing the 
action under consideration. 297 The CEQ's definition of cumulative 
effects, however, includes incremental impacts of proposed agency 
action on the environment "when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of" the agency or 
person conducting the action. 298 Although cumulative impacts may 
be individually minor, they are considered significant when con-
ducted collectively over a period of time. 299 
In making a cumulative effects determination, an agency need not 
engage in the detailed analysis required in an EIS.300 Instead, its 
EA must identify: (1) the area affected by the proposed project; (2) 
impacts anticipated in the area by the proposed project; (3) other 
past, proposed, and reasonably foreseeable actions affecting the 
area; (4) actual and anticipated impacts caused by other actions; and 
(5) the overall impact that would probably result from the cumulation 
of the individual impacts. 301 
293 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 879. 
294 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (1986). 
295Id. 
296 Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(1973). 
297 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1986). See supra notes 116-42 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of cumulative actions. 
298 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1986). 
299 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1986). 
300 Fritiofson V. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985). 
301 I d. at 1245. 
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The size of the area to be considered may be determined by factors 
such as the character of the landscape, identified ecosystems within 
the area, proposals to expand the proposed project or to conduct 
other projects in the same area, and the type of pollution problems 
caused by other actions in relation to those caused by the proposed 
action.302 Cumulative effects may be identified, not only by reviewing 
direct effects such as the loss of a population of organisms due to an 
agency's action but also the effect on other populations caused by 
the loss of the directly affected organisms. For example, the loss of 
benthic organisms caused by shell dredging affects organisms such 
as shrimp, crab, and bottom-feeding fish which feed on the ben-
thos.303 
The inclusion of other actions in a cumulative effects analysis is 
not determined by the public or private nature of those actions, or 
whether the parties conducting them are subject to NEPA.304 For 
example, in conducting a cumulative effects analysis for one area of 
a national forest, a court required the Forest Service to consider the 
forestry activities of other federal and state agencies as well as 
private parties because the activities impacted on fish habitat in the 
area. 305 Similarly, the Navy was required to consider the actions of 
other federal agencies and private parties involving an ocean dump 
used by the Navy to dispose of materials dredged during enlarge-
ment of a river channel. 306 An agency need not consider the potential 
environmental effects of actions that it determines are not reason-
ably foreseeable, however, as long as its determination is not arbi-
trary or capricious. 307 
Not only is the interrelatedness between various parties unimpor-
tant in a cumulative effects analysis, but so is the interrelatedness 
between the actions. As long as an action contributes to a cumulative 
effect on an identified natural resource, it need not be connected to 
any other action considered in that analysis. 308 The cumulative 
302Id. at 1246-47; National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 
942 (D. Or. 1984), order vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986). 
See also North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 600-01 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (EIS analyzed 
cumulative impacts of other energy development projects in Alaska's North Slope area). 
3{)3 Louisiana ex rel. Guste V. Lee, 635 F. Supp. 1107, 1122 n.34 (E.D. La. 1986). 
304 See National Wildlife Fed'n, 592 F. Supp. at 942. 
305 Id. 
306 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1975). 
307 See North Carolina V. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 439-40 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
30" Cf. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 696 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (on rehearing) cert. granted sub nom., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Pro-
tective Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987) (although the environmental effects of road construction 
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impact establishes the relationship between the disparate 
actions. 309 
If a threshold determination identifies cumulatively significant ef-
fects involving the proposed action, the effects must be analyzed in 
an EIS.310 One court held that such an analysis must include a list 
of projects with cumulative or related impacts, a concise summary 
of the listed projects' anticipated environmental impacts (incorpo-
rating additional information on impacts by reference where appro-
priate), and an analysis of the cumulative or combined effects of the 
listed projects. 311 
8. Effects on Historic, Scientific, or Cultural Resources 
An effect's intensity is also measured by the degree to which an 
action may cause the loss or destruction of significant scientific, 
historical, or cultural resources or to which it may affect structures, 
sites, districts, highways, or objects listed in or eligible for listing 
in the National Register of Historic Places. 312 Thus, if a project will 
seriously impair an ecologically rich area to the detriment of resident 
wildlife,313 the significance of the effects must be considered. 
If an action would raze an historic building in an urban area, 
significance may not necessarily be found. One court enjoined de-
molition of an historic building pending consideration of alterna-
tives. 314 Another court, however, found that the impacts of an his-
toric building's demolition did not need to be considered. 315 The court 
reasoned that because the only environmental effects of demolition 
were architectural and historic, the effects were social. 316 Standing 
alone, social effects do not require preparation of an EIS.317 In 
another case, a court found that simply because an action will affect 
historic buildings, it does not mean that the action will have a sig-
and timber sales must be considered together because they are cumulative, the court does 
not discuss whether projects need to be connected). 
309 See Natural Resources Defense Council, 524 F.2d at 89, n.9. 
310 National Wildlife Fed'n, 592 F. Supp. at 942. 
311 Akers v. Resor, 443 F. Supp. 1355, 1360 (W.D. Tenn. 1978). 
312 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(8) (1986). 
313 See Patterson v. Exon, 415 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-82 (D. Neb. 1976). 
314 See Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 1972). 
See also Aertsen v. Harris, 467 F. Supp. 117, 121 (D. Mass. 1979) (agency must consider 
effect of demolition of historic building as well as effect of replacing it). 
315 Committee to Save the Fox Bldg. v. Birmingham Branch of Fed. Reserve Bank, 497 F. 
Supp. 504, (N.D. Ala. 1980). 
316Id. at 511. 
317 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1986) (discussed supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text). 
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nificant effect. 318 Where better examples of a building's features 
existed in other retained historic buildings, or where features inte-
gral to the building's historic, cultural, or architectural significance 
would not be affected, the court found the agency's determination 
of nonsignificance to be reasonable.319 
9. Effect on Endangered Species 
The CEQ regulations require agencies to evaluate the degree to 
which actions may adversely affect endangered or threatened species 
or critical habitat identified under the Endangered Species Act. 320 
The possibility that an endangered species may be present in an 
area may not necessarily amount to a significant effect under 
NEP A.321 Neither does the existence of an endangered species in 
the affected area necessarily require preparation of an EIS.322 If an 
agency shows on the basis of an adequate EA that the existence of 
the endangered species will not be seriously threatened by the agen-
cy's action, the duty to prepare an EIS is not triggered. 323 
10. Compliance with Federal, State, or Local Law 
A final criterion for determining the significance of an action's 
environmental effects is whether the action has the potential to 
violate federal, state, or local environmental protection laws.324 
Agencies aid compliance with other environmental laws by listing 
relevant laws in their NEP A compliance criteria. 325 In some cases, 
other laws and regulations will have detailed criteria for compliance 
which approximate the NEP A process for a threshold determination. 
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promul-
gated extensive criteria for the evaluation of permit applications for 
ocean dumping under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctu-
318 Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982). 
319 I d. at 860. 
320 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9) (1986). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(l) (1985). 
321 See Falls Road Impact Comm. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678, 696 (E.D. Wis.), afl'd, 737 
F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1984). 
322 Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 596 F. Supp. 518, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1984), 
afl'd, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985). 
323Id. 
324 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(10) (1986). 
325 See, e.g., Department of the Interior, National Environmental Policy Act; Revised Im-
plementing Procedures [hereinafter Revised Implementing Procedures], 45 Fed. Reg. 27,541, 
27,545-27,548 (1980). 
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aries Act. 326 The criteria which expand on the Act are followed by 
the EPA and the Corps of Engineers in permit decisions. 327 
Agencies may combine their NEPA procedures with procedures 
required by other laws. 328 Although compliance with other laws does 
not ensure compliance with NEPA,329 that compliance is relevant to 
determining if an agency's threshold determination was reason-
able. 330 
An agency's compliance with local zoning ordinances is especially 
relevant to threshold determinations. By complying with local ordi-
nances, an agency demonstrates that it is acting in accordance with 
the demands of the community's residents regarding land use, con-
struction safeguards, aesthetics, population density, crime control, 
and neighborhood cohesiveness.331 Under these circumstances, 
courts are more likely to uphold an agency's determination of non-
significance. 332 Violation of zoning ordinances, however, does not 
necessarily mean that an environmental effect is significant. 333 
C. Measures to Mitigate Adverse Environmental Effects 
The CEQ defines mitigation to include: (1) a decision not to take 
all or part of a proposed action; (2) limitation of the action's imple-
mentation and either its degree or magnitude in order to minimize 
impacts; (3) repair, rehabilitation, and restoration of an affected 
environment; (4) preservation and maintenance operations conducted 
during an action's implementation to reduce or eliminate its effects 
over time; and (5) replacement or provision of substitute resources 
326 40 C.F.R. § 227 (1986). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982 & Supp. III 1986). 
327 40 C.F.R. § 220.l(a) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.145(e)(2) (1986); Corps of Engineers, Final 
Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,236 (1986) 
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 324.4). 
328 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(g) (1986); see also 33 C.F.R. § 230.20 (1986) (Corps of Engineers 
regulation requiring cooperation with state and local agencies in NEPA procedure). 
329 See Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (NEPA was violated 
during ocean dumping actions by EPA and Corps under the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act). 
330 See Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (compliance 
with National Historic Preservation Act is relevant to review of a threshold determination 
under NEPA); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1476-77 (D. Mass. 
1984) (compliance with Cape Cod National Seashore Act adds weight to agency's decision not 
to prepare an EIS). 
331 Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 
1029, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
332 [d.; Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1982). 
333 Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., 508 F. Supp. 112, 116 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
100 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:59 
or environments in order to compensate for an action's impact. 334 It 
is not clear whether mitigation measures must include all the above 
items, or whether one item can be selected in lieu of the others. The 
Corps of Engineers uses the last form of mitigation (known as "com-
pensatory" mitigation) to require construction, enhancement, or ded-
ication to public use of wetlands in cases in which the mitigation is 
necessary to ensure that the proposed action for which a permit has 
been applied is not inconsistent with the public interest. 335 Compen-
satory mitigation can be on-site or off-site. 336 
The record of an agency's decision to impose mitigation measures 
differs according to whether the measures are included in an EIS or 
an EA. When an agency makes a decision to proceed with an alter-
native outlined in an EIS, it must state whether it has adopted "all 
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm" in-
cluded under its selected alternative.337 If an agency makes mitiga-
tion a part of its action, it must ensure that mitigation measures are 
included in permits, grants, and the like, and that funding is condi-
tioned on compliance with the measures. 338 When an agency decides 
to proceed with an action based on an EA, the CEQ recommends 
that it use the above described process, even though the environ-
mental effects of its action were shown to be insignificant before use 
of the mitigation measures. 339 Commenting and cooperating agencies 
may request monitoring of mitigation measures proposed by them. 340 
If mitigation measures are used to reduce the environmental ef-
fects of an action below the significance level, the CEQ permits an 
agency to rely on those measures in not preparing an EIS only if 
the measures are imposed by statute or regulation, or were con-
tained in the original proposal. 341 The CEQ recommends that EAs 
and FONSIs containing mitigation measures be made publicly avail-
able thirty days before the action proceeds. 342 If mitigation measures 
334 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1986). 
335 Corps of Engineers, Final Rule for Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,208 
(1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4). See Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 
837--38 (9th Cir. 1986) (offsite mitigation is proper under appropriate circumstances). See also 
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. V. Jantzen, 589 F. Supp. 113, 116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
(in exchange for permission to develop, developers agreed to dedicate open space, to preserve 
area as undisturbed habitat of endangered species, and to restore and maintain habitat). 
336 [d. 
337 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (1986). 
338 [d. § 1505.3(a)-(b). 
339 NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,037--38. 
340 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1986). 
341 NEPA Questions, supra note 36, at 18,038. 
342 [d. 
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are added to a proposal during the EA process or scoping, they do 
not obviate the need to prepare an EIS.343 According to the CEQ, 
if a proposed action is redefined during scoping to include mitigation 
measures, the entire proposal must be resubmitted, and the EA and 
FONSI made publicly available for thirty days.344 
All courts do not follow the CEQ's information advice regarding 
the type of mitigation measures which may be considered in a thresh-
old determination. 345 According to courts which permit the use of 
other types of mitigation measures, the measures may offset oth-
erwise significant impacts as long as the measures are fully consid-
ered before an action proceeds,346 and the action is conditioned on 
them. 347 The mitigation measures need not completely compensate 
for all the action's adverse environmental effects. 348 
When a court reviews an EA and FONSI which relies on mitiga-
tion measures to reduce an action's environmental effects, it exam-
ines the likelihood of the mitigation measures occurring and the 
participation of other agencies and the public in the procedure. Con-
tractual obligations,349 design modifications,350 and measures planned 
in close cooperation with the local community,351 therefore, may be 
considered in the threshold determination. Mitigation measures 
based on good intentions may not be considered. 352 
The informational purpose of NEP A requires mitigation measures 
to be subject to public comment. Thus, measures based on planned 
scientific studies alone are inadequate because they preclude involve-
ment by other agencies and the public. 353 Descriptions of the mea-
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Dravo 
Basic Materials V. Louisiana 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotch-
man's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But see Sierra Club 
V. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 880 (lst Cir. 1985) (following CEQ advice). 
346 Cabinet Mountains, 685 F.2d at 683. See also Mardis v. Big Nance Creek Water Mgmt. 
Dist., 578 F. Supp. 770, 787 (N.D. Ala. 1983), a/I'd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (interagency 
team aided agency in designing mitigation measures). 
347 Cabinet Mountains, 685 F.2d at 684; Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d at 1083. 
348 Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 1985). 
349 Lee, 758 F.2d at 1083; Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
350 Town of Orangetown V. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1099 (1984); Bosco V. Beck, 475 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (D.N.J.), a/I'd, 614 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980). 
351 City & County of San Francisco V. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1980). 
352 Preservation Coalition, Inc., 667 F.2d at 860. 
353 Jones V. Gordon, 621 F. Supp. 7, 12-13 CD. Alaska. 1985), a/I'd in part and rev'd in 
nonpertinent part, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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sures must be provided; a listing is inadequate. 354 Measures must 
also be evaluated to determine how they will mitigate environmental 
effects.355 Conclusory statements regarding their effects are inade-
quate. 356 
D. Monitoring Programs 
Agencies may conduct monitoring programs to ensure that their 
decisions are being executed. The CEQ encourages the use of mon-
itoring in actions for which an EIS has been prepared,357 and the 
use of monitoring and enforcement programs for actions involving 
mitigation measures. 358 If monitoring and enforcement programs are 
adopted in a decision to proceed with an action involving mitigation, 
they should be summarized in the record of decision. 359 The result 
of relevant monitored actions should be made available to the public 
on request. 360 
Monitoring programs may not take the place of informed decisions 
regarding an action's environmental consequences. In cases in which 
an agency has proposed discontinuing a project if a certain result is 
evidenced by a monitoring program, the agency has been found to 
have made a determination to proceed without knowing the full 
environmental effects of its action. 361 A court may reach a contrary 
result, however, if the same type of monitoring program is formu-
lated to comply with an act other than NEPA even in cases where 
compliance with NEP A means that the action proceeds after an EA 
354 See Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 (9th 
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1971 (1987). See also Simmans V. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 
21 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (requiring full discussion of mitigation measures in EA and FONSI). 
355 Steamboaters V. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 759 F.2d 1382, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985). 
356 Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep V. United States Dep't of Agric. 681 F.2d 1172, 1180-
81 (9th Cir. 1982); Nat. Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 943 
(D. Or. 1984), order vacated in part and appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Joseph V. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141, 156 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
357 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1986). 
358 Id. § 1505.2(c). 
359Id. § 1505.2. The record of decision is the published record accompanying an agency's 
decision to proceed with an action, based on an EIS. 
360 Id. § 1505.3(d). 
361 See Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 
1181 (9th Cir. 1982) (basing future of action on results of monitoring program "represents an 
agency decision to act now and deal with the environmental consequences later"); Sierra Club 
V. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120, 131 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (basing future of action on results of 
monitoring program "is a virtual confession [that the project would proceed] without the 
responsible federal officials knowing the pluses and minuses of the pertinent environmental 
factors"). 
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and FONSI. 362 The difference lies in whether the monitoring plan is 
prepared to comply with NEP A or with another act. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The methodology for making threshold determinations is relatively 
settled throughout the federal agencies, as is the nature of effects 
considered in making such determinations. Less settled is the scope 
of actions to be addressed in threshold determinations. Some agen-
cies and courts focus on the type of action involved, but a trend is 
growing which focuses on the affected natural resources regardless 
of the type of action affecting them. 
The courts have been at the forefront of this trend, basing their 
decisions on criteria contained in the CEQ regulations. By extending 
the scope of actions which an agency must consider in making a 
threshold determination, the courts have required agencies to con-
sider the cumulative environmental effects of individually insignifi-
cant actions on identifiable natural resources. Integration of the 
extended scope of actions considered in a threshold determination 
into agency procedures is resulting in increased environmental pro-
tection, which is the cornerstone of NEPA. 
The list of criteria considered by agencies and courts in threshold 
determinations adheres closely to that contained in the CEQ regu-
lations. The CEQ criteria are unchanged since their publication in 
1977. The CEQ criteria, together with procedures contained in the 
CEQ regulations, provide a basis for federal agencies to make 
threshold determinations. The criteria and procedures are supple-
mented by individual agencies in order to address specific concerns 
of those agencies. The resulting framework for making threshold 
determinations has been further supplemented and refined by the 
courts. The broad scope of actions subject to NEP A means that the 
framework will never be complete. The federal agencies' considera-
tion of the framework's criteria, and compliance with its procedures, 
ensures that most, if not all, areas of environmental concern are 
addressed in threshold determinations. 
362 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 1985). 
